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herding women into particular, limited, roles.2 At first
glance, one may understandably wonder what would
lead women to accept such an ideology.
Feminist scholars have both documented the
extensive participation of women in organizations that
subscribe to Hindutva ideology and, in many cases,
voiced their belief that this participation is not empowering for women. To quote Meera Sehgal, paramilitary
training offered to women within the movement is
“more effective in constructing an alarmist, besieged
mentality rather than the self-confident and selfreliant one proclaimed by the Samiti’s discourse of
empowerment.”3 Sehgal focused and based her conclusions on the Rashtra Sevika Samiti, a women’s wing of
one particular Hindutva organization, the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh. When one examines the situation of women within Hindutva over time and across
various organizations, however, it appears that they
are more empowered by their participation in these
organizations than one might imagine. A comprehensive examination of the role of women in the many
disparate organizations that come under the saffron
banner of Hindutva reveals two things. First, the
definition of femininity and the role of women within
the movement have, far from remaining static, evolved
greatly over time. Second, the different roles played by
women in different organizations demonstrate that the
saffron women come in different hues. Rather than
allowing themselves to be defined by any particular
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Introduction
The Hindu Nationalist Movement, or Hindutva, a
traditionally masculine bastion, has been subject to a
quiet but significant assault on its core philosophy.
Interestingly, this attack has come from within the
movement, in the form of a near insurgency. Women
have penetrated its ranks and carved unique niches
for themselves and have started focusing on creating
a more inclusive agenda. Women in Hindutva catapulted themselves into positions of power within the
movement in the 1990s, and this has significantly
changed the face of the movement. Though the transformation into a democratic and feminist Hindutva is
far from complete, women have made their mark and
helped to chart a positive course for its ideology.
Hindutva begins with the belief that India has
always been and should be a Hindu rashtra, or nation.
It is firmly rooted in the conviction that citizens of
India must accept a cultural, if not religious Hinduism.
This explicitly religious affiliation has often led leaders
of the Hindutva movement to adopt fundamentalist, or
anti-feminist, stances on women’s issues.1 Scholars
have underlined many instances of the movement
1
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endeavor, the RSS established several sister organizations, including the Rashtra Sevika Samiti (Samiti) in
1936, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) in 1964, and
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980. The RSS is
professedly apolitical and focuses on the central goal
of establishing the cultural Hindu rashtra, while the
VHP focuses on the preservation and propagation of
Hinduism as a religion. The BJP, as a national party,
is explicitly political, and, therefore, often treads a
more religiously and culturally neutral path. The
organizations, while structurally similar and considered affiliated, are still separate, each with its own
leaders and specific goals. Each has one or more
women’s wings that are, again, affiliated but in many
ways separate. These various organizations are collectively known as the Sangh Parivar.
Even a cursory look at the early years of Hindutva
reveals a marked emphasis within the movement on
masculinity and a concomitant relegation of women to
a narrow and limited role. The imagery of nation as
motherland is likewise pervasive in early Hindutva
writings. M.S. Golwalkar, a prominent RSS leader,
effusively wrote of India, “This is our sacred land,
Bharat, a land whose glories are sung by the gods…
well, this is the mother of us all, our glorious motherland.6 Within this framework, with the nation viewed
as mother and female, Hindus, particularly those
within the Sangh Parivar, were envisioned as brave
masculine soldiers standing ready to do battle for her.
Golwalkar’s book, which adjures Hindu men to be
“men with capital ‘M’” (sic) and goes into great detail

notion of femininity within the movement, women
expand the concept of femininity to reflect their
various disparate actions and beliefs. By refusing to be
limited by a restrictive definition of femininity, women
behave as active agents within the movement. Women
within Hindutva shape the movement as they carve a
place for themselves within it. Throughout their
participation in the movement, women have conformed
to some extent to their organizations’ evolving requirements. This paper argues that by making themselves
indispensable in this way, Hindutva women have
carved unique niches for themselves and, on a larger
scale, contributed to the empowerment of women in
terms of rejecting traditional roles for less restrictive
ones.
Saffron Beginnings: Early Hindutva
The establishment in 1925 of the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) marked the crystallization
of a movement based on a spirit of Hindu revivalism
that can be traced back to the late 1800s. Hindu
revivalism is associated with resistance to British
Christian missionary activity in the 1800s, Hindu
misgivings about Muslim mobilization during the
Khilafat Movement in the 1920s, and the desire of
upper caste Hindus to perpetuate their worldview.4
Following the establishment of the RSS by Keshav
Baliram Hedgewar, Hindutva became an established
movement working toward the defined goal of reclaiming India as a Hindu rashtra.5 In the course of this
4
Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in
India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 12-14.
5
Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 33.
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Golwalkar, drawing on the Hindu epic Ramayana,
states, “When the five Pandavas went to see Kunti,
their mother, before the war of Mahabharata, she
blessed them saying, ‘Go ye all to battle. This is the
occasion for which Kshatriya women give birth to
sons’…Let every mother speak in the same heroic
strain to her sons even now.”8 The distinction between
women as passive, resigned mothers and men as
active, brave warrior sons is clear. The fact that this is
one of the sole references in Golwalkar’s book to
cultural expectations of women or definitions of
femininity underscores the fact that at the time the
maternal role was the primary role open to women
within Hindutva. The other role Golwalkar defined for
women was that of devoted, self-sacrificing wife.
Moreover, Hindutva tended to herd women more
towards the private sphere than the public one. Pralay
Kanungo notes,

about how to mould men with a mission, demonstrates
the masculinist bias inherent in early Hindutva.
The way the RSS was conceptualized and organized
reflected this early masculine focus. The fact that it
was originally formed as an all male organization, and
that women, rather than being integrated directly into
the RSS, were brought into the Samiti, a separate
wing, meant at the very least a basic gender segregation. The choice of saffron as their banner color was
inspired by the flag of the legendary Hindu hero
Shivaji, and metonymically to the sadhus and sadhvis,
or religious renunciates, of Hindu tradition, who were
always garbed in saffron. The system of shakhas, or
local groups, which the RSS instituted, and the emphasis on exercise, discipline, physical and strength
training reflect the early Hindutva masculine focus.
Golwalkar considered one of the greatest problems in
Hindu society to be the fact that, as he put it, “In
dress, in habits, in literature and in every aspect of our
day-to-day life ‘modernism’ has come to mean effeminacy.”7 Golwalkar thus encouraged his followers to
reject what he perceived as western modernity, and to
embrace traditionalism. Traditional gender roles were
key to the kind of traditionalism he advocated, and
this required that men within the movement distance
themselves from what he perceived as effeminacy in
the rest of society. The decidedly masculinist emphasis
of early Hindutva is reflected in the attempt of men
within the Sangh Parivar to carve out a masculine
identity while rejecting what they considered feminine.
While the Sangh Parivar was crafting an ideal
masculine identity, it was likewise defining femininity.

The RSS did not approve of any overt political role
for wom en during the Golwalkar era. It could not
swallow the fact that the highest political office in
India w as held by a wom an. The RSS m outhpiece
Organiser described Indira Gandhi’s rule as disastrous and adm irably quoted Napoleon: ‘A statesman
has his heart in his brain; a wom an’s brain is generally in her heart.’9

Ram Janmabhoomi: A Turning Point
While the role of Hindutva women has always been
to some extent fluid, the Ram Janmabhoomi movement
8

Golwalkar 271.
Pralay Kanungo, RSS’s Tryst with Politics: From Hedgewar
to Sudershan (Delhi: Manohar, 2002), 160.
9

7

Golwalkar 230.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2009

139

5

Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 14 [2009], Art. 13

138

Historical Perspectives

Saffron, Spice and Everything Nice?

June 2009

about how to mould men with a mission, demonstrates
the masculinist bias inherent in early Hindutva.
The way the RSS was conceptualized and organized
reflected this early masculine focus. The fact that it
was originally formed as an all male organization, and
that women, rather than being integrated directly into
the RSS, were brought into the Samiti, a separate
wing, meant at the very least a basic gender segregation. The choice of saffron as their banner color was
inspired by the flag of the legendary Hindu hero
Shivaji, and metonymically to the sadhus and sadhvis,
or religious renunciates, of Hindu tradition, who were
always garbed in saffron. The system of shakhas, or
local groups, which the RSS instituted, and the emphasis on exercise, discipline, physical and strength
training reflect the early Hindutva masculine focus.
Golwalkar considered one of the greatest problems in
Hindu society to be the fact that, as he put it, “In
dress, in habits, in literature and in every aspect of our
day-to-day life ‘modernism’ has come to mean effeminacy.”7 Golwalkar thus encouraged his followers to
reject what he perceived as western modernity, and to
embrace traditionalism. Traditional gender roles were
key to the kind of traditionalism he advocated, and
this required that men within the movement distance
themselves from what he perceived as effeminacy in
the rest of society. The decidedly masculinist emphasis
of early Hindutva is reflected in the attempt of men
within the Sangh Parivar to carve out a masculine
identity while rejecting what they considered feminine.
While the Sangh Parivar was crafting an ideal
masculine identity, it was likewise defining femininity.

139

Golwalkar, drawing on the Hindu epic Ramayana,
states, “When the five Pandavas went to see Kunti,
their mother, before the war of Mahabharata, she
blessed them saying, ‘Go ye all to battle. This is the
occasion for which Kshatriya women give birth to
sons’…Let every mother speak in the same heroic
strain to her sons even now.”8 The distinction between
women as passive, resigned mothers and men as
active, brave warrior sons is clear. The fact that this is
one of the sole references in Golwalkar’s book to
cultural expectations of women or definitions of
femininity underscores the fact that at the time the
maternal role was the primary role open to women
within Hindutva. The other role Golwalkar defined for
women was that of devoted, self-sacrificing wife.
Moreover, Hindutva tended to herd women more
towards the private sphere than the public one. Pralay
Kanungo notes,
The RSS did not approve of any overt political role
for wom en during the Golwalkar era. It could not
swallow the fact that the highest political office in
India w as held by a wom an. The RSS m outhpiece
Organiser described Indira Gandhi’s rule as disastrous and adm irably quoted Napoleon: ‘A statesman
has his heart in his brain; a wom an’s brain is generally in her heart.’9

Ram Janmabhoomi: A Turning Point
While the role of Hindutva women has always been
to some extent fluid, the Ram Janmabhoomi movement
8

Golwalkar 271.
Pralay Kanungo, RSS’s Tryst with Politics: From Hedgewar
to Sudershan (Delhi: Manohar, 2002), 160.
9

7

Golwalkar 230.

http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol14/iss1/13

6

Shenoy: Saffron, Spice and Everything Nice?

140

Historical Perspectives

Saffron, Spice and Everything Nice?

June 2009

of the 1980s and 1990s offered women an unprecedented opportunity to break out of the traditional
feminine role that had been defined for them within
the movement. In the years immediately following the
Partition of India, the Sangh Parivar was compelled to
moderate its rhetoric for fear of being banned by a
fiercely anti-communalist Congress. The bans instituted on the RSS after the assassination of Mohandas
Karamchand Gandhi in 1948 and during the State of
Emergency declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
in 1975 reinforced these fears. In the 1980s, however,
two factors came together to result in widespread
legitimization of Hindutva across India: the weakening
of the Congress government’s opposition to
communalism and the increased militancy of minorities, including the Muslims (who pushed for and
brought about the institution of Muslim Personal Law,
under which Muslims were subject to Shariat rather
than a Universal Civil Code) and Sikhs (who were
agitating aggressively for the construction of a separate
Sikh state).10 The Sangh Parivar’s return to a more
hardline stance is reflected in the adoption in 1984 of
the issue of reclaiming the Ram Janmabhoomi temple
in Ayodhya as a central goal for the organizations. The
construction of the temple envisioned by the Sangh
Parivar would have involved the repossession of a piece
of land which was home to a sixteenth-century mosque
called the Babri Masjid, which was not being used in
the 1980s as a site of worship. The dismantling of the
mosque would have been a necessary first step in the
construction of the temple. The Sangh Parivar justified this on the basis that the mosque had been built
10

by the Mughal conqueror Babar over the ruins of a
destroyed Hindu temple.11
The Ram Janmabhoomi movement was unique in
the history of Hindutva in the sense that it unified
Hindus in the movement in a common, definable and
more immediate goal than the more abstract and longterm notion of a Hindu India. While the movement was
gaining critical mass, women were able to join the
mainstream as active players in the common endeavor.
They were able for the first time to participate in
various ways, as planners, organizers, and activists.
While the roles individual women played were multifaceted, there was a relative homogenization of
women’s roles within the various organizations under
the saffron umbrella. For instance, while Sadhvi
Rithambhara, a member of the VHP’s Sadhvi Shakti
Parishad, had gained significant notoriety as a rouser
of communal passions, in line with her organization’s
relatively hardline philosophy, Uma Bharti, a member
of the more political BJP’s Mahila Morcha, participated
in similar ways. Both Bharti and Rithambara became
prominent symbols of the movement, aggressively
calling Hindu men to action. The Babri Masjid was
visualized by Hindutva activists as a remnant of a time
when the nation had been conquered by foreign
invaders (the Mughals) and it was thus seen as a
blight on India’s honor. Given the fact that in Hindutva
ideology the nation is conceptualized as feminine, the
symbolism of women calling on men to defend their
own and their country’s honor would have resonated
significantly with Hindutva men. In one instance,
Sadhvi Rithambhara declared, “You keep saying that
11

Jaffrelot 331-332.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2009

141

7

Jaffrelot 363.

Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 14 [2009], Art. 13

140

Historical Perspectives

of the 1980s and 1990s offered women an unprecedented opportunity to break out of the traditional
feminine role that had been defined for them within
the movement. In the years immediately following the
Partition of India, the Sangh Parivar was compelled to
moderate its rhetoric for fear of being banned by a
fiercely anti-communalist Congress. The bans instituted on the RSS after the assassination of Mohandas
Karamchand Gandhi in 1948 and during the State of
Emergency declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
in 1975 reinforced these fears. In the 1980s, however,
two factors came together to result in widespread
legitimization of Hindutva across India: the weakening
of the Congress government’s opposition to
communalism and the increased militancy of minorities, including the Muslims (who pushed for and
brought about the institution of Muslim Personal Law,
under which Muslims were subject to Shariat rather
than a Universal Civil Code) and Sikhs (who were
agitating aggressively for the construction of a separate
Sikh state).10 The Sangh Parivar’s return to a more
hardline stance is reflected in the adoption in 1984 of
the issue of reclaiming the Ram Janmabhoomi temple
in Ayodhya as a central goal for the organizations. The
construction of the temple envisioned by the Sangh
Parivar would have involved the repossession of a piece
of land which was home to a sixteenth-century mosque
called the Babri Masjid, which was not being used in
the 1980s as a site of worship. The dismantling of the
mosque would have been a necessary first step in the
construction of the temple. The Sangh Parivar justified this on the basis that the mosque had been built
10

Jaffrelot 331-332.

Saffron, Spice and Everything Nice?

June 2009

141

by the Mughal conqueror Babar over the ruins of a
destroyed Hindu temple.11
The Ram Janmabhoomi movement was unique in
the history of Hindutva in the sense that it unified
Hindus in the movement in a common, definable and
more immediate goal than the more abstract and longterm notion of a Hindu India. While the movement was
gaining critical mass, women were able to join the
mainstream as active players in the common endeavor.
They were able for the first time to participate in
various ways, as planners, organizers, and activists.
While the roles individual women played were multifaceted, there was a relative homogenization of
women’s roles within the various organizations under
the saffron umbrella. For instance, while Sadhvi
Rithambhara, a member of the VHP’s Sadhvi Shakti
Parishad, had gained significant notoriety as a rouser
of communal passions, in line with her organization’s
relatively hardline philosophy, Uma Bharti, a member
of the more political BJP’s Mahila Morcha, participated
in similar ways. Both Bharti and Rithambara became
prominent symbols of the movement, aggressively
calling Hindu men to action. The Babri Masjid was
visualized by Hindutva activists as a remnant of a time
when the nation had been conquered by foreign
invaders (the Mughals) and it was thus seen as a
blight on India’s honor. Given the fact that in Hindutva
ideology the nation is conceptualized as feminine, the
symbolism of women calling on men to defend their
own and their country’s honor would have resonated
significantly with Hindutva men. In one instance,
Sadhvi Rithambhara declared, “You keep saying that
11

Jaffrelot 363.

http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol14/iss1/13

8

Shenoy: Saffron, Spice and Everything Nice?

142

Historical Perspectives

Saffron, Spice and Everything Nice?

June 2009

this part of the world.”13 Paradoxically, some of the
Hindutva women also shielded journalists and photographers from the fury of the mass hysteria. Hundreds
of female activists threw themselves on the streets in
an attempt to stop police troops from reaching the site
at which the demolition was taking place.
The newly varied and militant roles played by
women in the Ram Janmabhoomi movement brought
them into a level of prominence they had never before
achieved. As Amy Waldman described it, “After seeing
the fervor of women leading up to and culminating
with the 1992 destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya,
Hindu nationalists also have tried to harness the
power of women as militants.”14 In the years following
the incident, women’s organizations within Hindutva
came to play a more prominent role within the movement, and women themselves came increasingly to the
forefront as leaders.
Another outcome of the Ram Janmabhoomi incident
was a parting, to a certain extent, within the Sangh
Parivar between the more explicitly religiously affiliated
organizations (the VHP and the RSS, in particular),
and the more politically oriented BJP. The days immediately following the demolition of the mosque witnessed large scale riots that left around three thousand people, Hindus as well as Muslims, dead.15
Horrified at this outbreak of communal violence, many
potential supporters began to turn away from the BJP.

you will sacrifice yourselves. But before we sacrifice
ourselves we will compel ‘others’ to sacrifice themselves. We will not only shed our own blood but we will
also make the blood of ‘others’ flow.”12 This newly
aggressive stance was a clear departure from the more
benign role of resigned wife or mother that had been
defined for women in the movement in the early years.
The immediate project of reclaiming the country’s
honor (as the Hindutva leadership perceived it) by
removing the stain they viewed the Masjid as being on
its landscape, required women, as living symbols of the
feminine nation, to become aggressive in their demands that Hindu men defend them. The resigned,
self-sacrificing image of passivity that women were
earlier asked to project within the movement would
hardly have resonated with the men in such a way as
to draw them into violence.
Capitalizing on the Ram Janmabhoomi movement’s
needs and requirements, therefore, women within
Hindutva came out of their virtual purdah in droves,
taking on newly active roles within the movement. In
1992, a number of Hindutva activists broke through
barriers and dismantled the Babri Masjid. Thousands
of Hindutva women participated in the demolition.
Women who had previously been adjured to be passive
homemakers became proponents of violence. A Washington Post article from the time documents women as
having “turned their wrath on journalists, beating
dozens of reporters and smashing cameras in a rush
of violence against the news media unprecedented in

13

Molly Moore, “When the Mob Turns Against The
Messengers; After Mosque Assault, Hindus Attack Journalists,”
Washington Post Foreign Service (December 1992).
14
Amy Waldman, “Win an Election? Tough Part is the
Nomination,” New York Times, December 5, 2003.
15
Jaffrelot 460-461.

12
Kumkum Sangari, “Consent, Agency and Rhetorics of
Incitement,” Economic and Political Weekly (May 1993), 879.
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also make the blood of ‘others’ flow.”12 This newly
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this part of the world.”13 Paradoxically, some of the
Hindutva women also shielded journalists and photographers from the fury of the mass hysteria. Hundreds
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with the 1992 destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya,
Hindu nationalists also have tried to harness the
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forefront as leaders.
Another outcome of the Ram Janmabhoomi incident
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Parivar between the more explicitly religiously affiliated
organizations (the VHP and the RSS, in particular),
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13

Molly Moore, “When the Mob Turns Against The
Messengers; After Mosque Assault, Hindus Attack Journalists,”
Washington Post Foreign Service (December 1992).
14
Amy Waldman, “Win an Election? Tough Part is the
Nomination,” New York Times, December 5, 2003.
15
Jaffrelot 460-461.

http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol14/iss1/13

10

Shenoy: Saffron, Spice and Everything Nice?

144

Historical Perspectives

Saffron, Spice and Everything Nice?

June 2009

On December 15th , the BJP led governments of
Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh
were disbanded by the Congress-led national government. V.K. Rai states:

members of it, so their perspectives are to some extent
different from our outlook” (sic).18
The ideological divergence that occurred between
the political and religious sister organizations was
mirrored in the divergent trajectories of women under
the saffron umbrella. While women within the VHP’s
Durga Vahini and the Samiti continued to adopt
relatively provocative and hardline positions, those
within the BJP’s Mahila Morcha considerably softened
their stances and adopted a more secular approach.
This contrast is captured when one examines the
stances of three women in particular: Sadhvi
Rithambara (on the religious side), and Sushma
Swaraj and Uma Bharti (on the political side).
Sadhvi Rithambara became the founder and leader
of the VHP’s ultra militant women’s wing, the Vahini,
in 1991. Her vision of militant womanhood involved
equipping women with a much more intense training
in the martial arts. This involved indoctrinating the
members to shed all traces of passivity and to be
prepared to fight to defend their own and the country’s
honor. During the Ram Janmabhoomi movement,
Teesta Setalvad notes, members of the Vahini were
given katars, sheathed knives, and adjured by
Rithambara to defend themselves, if need be, and to
“ensure your katars taste blood.”19 After 1992, the
Vahini remained the most militant of the Hindutva
women’s organizations, and among those most committed to religious and cultural Hinduism. Rithambara

After the destruction of Babri m osque, the BJP
leadership began to realise the lim itations to religious mobilization. It found that the crowds in
election m eetings did not respond to the virulent
anti-Muslim speech and did not approve of the
actual destruction of the m osque or the ‘Ekatmata
Yatra’ (m arch for unity) of the VHP. 16

The BJP came to realize that it would have to change
its strategy if it wanted to remain relevant in the
Indian political context.17
Saffron Split: Ideological Divergences after 1992
The BJP began, therefore, to moderate the religiosity of its rhetoric in order to distance itself somewhat
from the Ram Janmabhoomi issue. In this, it differed
from the RSS and VHP, which continued to hold dear
the goal of reclaiming the primary Hindu sites of
worship on which mosques were based. As a result,
there was something of an ideological split between the
organizations; thus, a VHP leader states, of the 1993
election, “There were some differences in the high
commands of the BJP and the VHP. VHP and RSS are
purely Hindu minded and pro-Hindu bodies while the
BJP, being a political body, certain Muslims are also

18
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herself continued to take a hardline stance after the
Ram Janmabhoomi incident. While she never again
achieved the notoriety she had at that time, she
continued to be a prominent ideologue within the
Vahini. While the target of her vitriolic attacks in the
early 1990s was the Indian Muslims, during the later
1990s, this was also broadened to include the Indian
Christian missionaries. Rithambara, along with the
VHP’s Swami Brahmananda, said in 1999 “that John
Paul II could visit India” on the express condition that
“he put an end to induced conversions of Hindus to
Christianity in India.”20 Rithambara’s continued
militancy is evident in the fact that she courted arrest
on multiple occasions during the course of the 1990s
by making inflammatory statements calculated to
arouse communal passions among the Hindus.21 Her
continued preoccupation with communal rabblerousing was very much in line with the goals and
commitments of her own organization (The Vahini, and
by extension, the VHP). Rithambara was making it
increasingly clear that she was not going to recede into
the political wilderness once the need of the hour had
been met.
While Rithambara, and the Vahini, continued to
adopt a martial stance after 1992, the BJP women
began to moderate the intensity of their rhetoric
considerably. The contrast between the divergent
trajectories of the more religious Hindutva women and
the more political ones is starkly evident when one

considers Uma Bharti, who, like Rithambara, had
become a prominent symbol of the Ram Janmabhoomi
movement. During the latter half of the 1990s, Bharti
moved increasingly into the political arena, and
concomitantly distanced herself from her earlier
belligerent stance. She rarely referred to the Ram
Janmabhoomi question and even explicitly stated in
1998 that two other previously contested Hindu holy
sites, Kashi and Mathura, would not be on her party’s
political agenda.22 The softening of her earlier antiMuslim perspective is showcased in her 1999 statement that she would reach out and offer her assistance to all, including Muslims. She commented at the
time, “I have already told them clearly that I will not
wear a green dupatta around my neck to please them.
Nor have I asked them to wear saffron.”23 Green and
saffron representing, respectively, the Muslim and
Hindu communities, the statement was evocative of
Bharti’s desire to reach out to the other community
while acknowledging their deep-seated differences. Her
newly moderate stance echoed her organization’s
adoption, after 1992, of a more neutral and mainstream position. Uma Bharti contined to be a leading
voice in Hindutva discourse throughout the 1990s.
Taking into account the varied stances of the
saffron women after the Ram Janmabhoomi incident,
two things become clear: that women were increasingly
able to empower themselves through participation in
Hindutva organizations, and that through these
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cludes that women within Hindutva play a more
complex role than one might imagine. Bharti and
Rithambara’s experiences would appear to bear out
this assertion.
Apart from inspiring women simply by virtue of
their presence as leaders, Hindutva women in different
organizations empowered women within their own
spheres in unique ways. Rithambara, coming from a
religious background, drew on established definitions
of femininity and transformed the traditional role of
mother from one of passivity into one of power. A 1998
Times of India article reported that the Sadhvi, speaking at a VHP function, “called upon womenfolk to
awaken and put up a brave fight against atrocities on
women and unite to face challenges,” and “said no
politician can solve the problems of society, and it is
only a mother who can set right our ills.”25
Rithambara’s adjuration to women that they fight to
protect themselves and her endorsement, as Vahini
leader, of programs to train Hindutva women, reflect
her view of the feminine as active rather than passive.
Although many of the social evils that she listed as
threatening to women, including beauty contests (an
insult to feminine dignity) and Muslim men (who, she
felt, could convert Hindu girls and draw them away
from their faith), were rooted in traditional values, the
fact that she was encouraging women to use nonpassive modes of resistance indicates a departure from
Golwalkar’s and the earlier Hindutva definition of
femininity. Her establishment in May 2003 of Vatsalya
Gram, which she describes as “a village of maternal

positions of power, they were able to empower other
women, albeit in different ways. Simply by virtue of
being prominent, powerful leaders within the movement, women like Rithambara and Bharti would surely
have inspired other Hindu women both within and
outside the organizations to transcend the limitations
of the traditional role that had previously been defined
for them. The different perspectives and positions
these women brought to the table lent complexity to
the movement’s definition of femininity. Amrita Basu,
speaking of Hindutva women leaders, notes that:
None of them is particularly nurturing… Regardless
of the personal hardships they m ay have experienced, they depict them selves as powerful agents
rather than passive victim s… Moreover, these
wom en’s backgrounds and life histories do not
conform to a singular m odel of Indian womanhood. 24

While, in Golwalkar’s time, femininity was defined
within Hindutva as simple, self-sacrificing passivity,
the variety of roles played by Bharti, Rithambara and
other leaders of the movement expanded this definition
considerably. During the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, both Bharti and Rithambara were especially
noticed for their incendiary, passionate rhetoric aimed
at inciting Hindu men into violence. While Bharti later
took on a role of almost diplomatic rapprochement,
Rithambara continued to define herself as a militant
guardian of Hindu values. In her essay, Basu con24
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extreme posture she adopted when Sonia Gandhi, the
widow of slain Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, was
projected as an opposition Prime Ministerial candidate
by the Congress Party. At the time, as a recent Express
Buzz article reports, Swaraj “threatened to shave her
head and eat only peanuts in a gesture of mourning if
Sonia Gandhi became prime minister after the
Congress-led coalition won the 2004 parliamentary
election.”27
By aligning themselves with party policy and
making themselves indispensable, leaders such as
Bharti and Swaraj rose through the ranks and assumed positions of power. From this standpoint they
began increasingly to work for the empowerment of
women outside the party. One instance of an almost
monolithic consensus of women across party lines was
the Women’s Reservation Bill, introduced in September
1996. Women of all major political parties came
together to endorse a bill that if passed would ensure
that 33 percent of seats in Parliament would be
reserved for women. Bharti and Swaraj were vocal and
unequivocal proponents of the bill. In November 1996,
Swaraj declared, “We have to force the issue. The male
mentality and male dominance cannot go on forever…
Male-style politics, marked by corruption and inefficiency, must end.”28 Bharti spoke repeatedly of the
need to harness women’s capabilities. In a stunning
departure from earlier representations of a woman’s
role within Hindutva, she stated in 1998,

love,” in Uttar Pradesh, is another example of her
empowering women through transforming traditional
values. The village operates as both a widows’ home
and an orphanage, and is based on the concept of
creating families held together by maternal love
through bringing destitute women and motherless
children together. While rooted in traditional ideals of
the importance of motherhood, the project empowers
the women and children it takes in by offering them
health care, education, and vocational and spiritual
training.26
While Rithambara, in line with her allegiance to
Vahini ideology, has sought to empower women within
the framework of a relatively traditional socio-cultural
schema, the BJP women who have attained a level of
acceptance within their own organization, have focused their efforts on economic and political parity for
women. In the space opened up for women in
Hindutva in the aftermath of the Ram Janmabhoomi
movement, another female leader, Sushma Swaraj,
came into prominence. Swaraj for the most part
exemplified the paradigm of the Hindutva woman who
throughout her career took on whatever agency the
party required of her, while continuing to systematically rise within its ranks. With few exceptions, she
maintained a diplomatic stance and established herself
within and outside the party as a political figure of
repute. However, even Swaraj notably sounded a
strident note on occasions when the party was on the
offensive, one example being the uncharacteristically

27
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addressing women’s issues demonstrates that for
many Hindutva women, the empowerment of women,
whatever that may mean in their particular (religious
or political) spheres, is a priority.
Scholars such as Sikata Banerjee and Paola
Bacchetta have argued that Hindutva women achieved
minimal gains for the feminist cause because despite
being empowering for them personally, the movement
reinforces sexist stereotypes. Meghana Nayak paraphrases Bacchetta as having said, “These women find
ways within Hindu nationalist discourse to become
political agents, yet they necessarily ‘ensure [sic] their
own confinement within the Hindu nationalist order.”31
While it is admittedly true that fundamentalism and
sexism continue to play a part in Hindutva, it is also
significant that the contributions women such as
Swaraj, Bharti and Rithambara have made to the
cause of women’s empowerment have increased
exponentially over time. Hindutva women tend to come
from extremely religious, traditional families, and the
organizations themselves reflect the traditional values
of their members and leaders.32 Out of necessity or
conviction, the women maintain an outward commitment to traditional Hindu values, but they have altered
the ideologies inherent within the movement in subtle
though powerful ways. Simply by bringing issues such
as women’s empowerment through physical training

It is claim ed that em powering wom en would ruin the
dom estic environm ent; that they would neglect their
hom es and children. But if a wom an's affection is a
result of being in bondage, if her love em erges from
com pulsion, from the fact that she is som ething of a
bonded labourer, then that is not love. That is the
love of a bonded labourer. Genuine affection can
spring only from econom ic independence. So give her
econom ic independence. 29

After the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, women were
able to use their newfound prominence and power as
leaders within the BJP to begin to shape the direction
in which Hindutva ideology evolved. In becoming vocal
proponents of women’s political, social and economic
equality, BJP women were beginning to transform
gender relationships within and outside the movement.
Conclusions
The trend of Hindutva women utilizing their own
power to empower others continued and intensified
after 2003. A spate of bills introduced by Sushma
Swaraj in Parliament in 2006 and 2007 illustrate this.
The bills addressed a wide range of issues, including
preventing cruelty and sexual harassment against
women within and outside the workplace, preventing
child prostitution, enforcing basic education for girls,
especially among the poor and lower caste, and protecting widows.30 This continued commitment to
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conceivably serve as a model for other underprivileged
groups. In the process, it is reasonable to hope that
the moderate and mainstream voices will provide the
dominant discourse.

and reservations for women into Hindutva discourse,
the saffron women have introduced a new focus that
was never part of the movement’s original ideology.
They have also begun to criticize the patriarchal power
structures that were part of the very essence of the
movement early on.
The argument that Hindutva organizations promote
sexism in terms of gender binaries, furthermore, holds
better for some organizations than others. While
religious organizations under the saffron umbrella,
motivated as they are by religious concerns, do emphasize traditional values, the BJP as a political party
often does not. Even within religious organizations
such as the Vahini and Samiti, however, the increased
attention paid to women’s issues reflects a great stride
forward within the religious or traditional sphere.
Although many feminist scholars have offered
perceptive critiques of the sexism within Hindutva
organizations, it is also within the scope of a feminist
analysis to recognize the subtle but significant gains
women have made. While these organizations are far
from being models of gender equality, one need only
look at the stark contrast between the Hindutva
definition of femininity before the Ram Janmabhoomi
incident and the multiple and varied definitions
women leaders have crafted in recent years to realize
the extent of the impact women have had and continue
to have on the movement. Sifting through these
multiple discourses, there emerges the possibility that
the very democracy within which both the Hindutva
and feminist movements have grown and gained vigor
will be the ultimate winner. This visible instance of
Hindutva women discovering ways to empower themselves within an otherwise confining system could
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